



Peace River Regional District
Oil Spill Panel Discussion

January 14th, 2009

Hosted by the Peace River Regional District

Abbreviated
AFTER ACTION REPORT

Report developed by:



JUSTICE INSTITUTE
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Emergency Management Division

Administrative Handling Instructions

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 14th 2009 an open forum panel discussion was held in the Peace River Regional District. The purpose of the panel discussion was to explore the structure and coordination of oil spill response and recovery operations while examining a hypothetical oil spill into a body of water which crosses the British Columbia / Alberta border.

The panel discussion ran from 8:00 am to 3:00 pm and was held at the Dawson Creek Best Western Hotel.

The exercise staff moderated the panel discussion, observed the participant conversations and recorded the discussion. These observations will be used to develop further recommendations that may be put in place in order to resolve issues related to the response and recovery operations directed at possible oil spills in the region.

DISCUSSION OBJECTIVES

#	Objective	Expected Actions	Met/Not Met
1)	Validate the activities related to notification of key agencies	a) Identify which agency contacts ERCB & PEP.	Met
2)	Clarify the response structure that will be used by participating agencies.	a) Identify the individual/agency with jurisdiction over response and recovery.	Met
		b) Discuss roles and responsibilities of responding agencies.	Met
		c) Review role of BC Hydro in controlling the oil spill	Met
		d) Identify characteristics of Incident Command Post	Met in part
		e) Identify if an Emergency Operations Center will be activated and where?	Met
		f) Identify characteristics of Emergency Operations Center.	<i>Needs further clarification</i>
		g) Determine when and how a state of emergency would be declared.	Met
		h) Review common Incident Command Structure terminology.	Met
		i) Review methods that will be used to coordinate messages to the media.	Met in part

3)	Determine the potential impact of this event on downstream users	a) List downstream users that may be impacted	Met
4)	Summarize the activities and standards to be followed in a successful cleanup	a) Determine the types of sampling that must be conducted at the site	Met in part, <i>needs further clarification</i>
		b) Identify standards that must be achieved in order for river cleanup to be considered successful?	Met in part, <i>needs further clarification</i>
		c) Determine appropriate disposal methods for materials used in cleanup, for both British Columbia/Alberta	Met in part, <i>needs further clarification</i>
5)	Clarify the process used for the provision of compensation	Identify the process that will be used to assess and verify compensation claims	Not Met
6)	Evaluate the conceptual model used to structure responding agencies	Advise changes to the conceptual model	Met

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overview

As mentioned previously, the purpose of this exercise was to explore the structure and coordination of oil spill response and recovery operations in a panel discussion examining hypothetical oil spill into a body of water which crosses the British Columbia / Alberta border.

B. Recommendations

Based on the input from participants and the exercise design team, a number of recommendations have been developed.

Please note: This document does not serve to bind participating agencies to complete these actions; rather, these actions have been identified as addressing a problem, issue or request arising from participant conversations and subsequent exercise design team analysis.

Where one or more “Responsible Agencies” have been identified, it is not to bind these agencies to completing these tasks. Instead, these agencies have been deemed by the exercise design team to be the most appropriate or best prepared to complete the identified task.

Finally, the exercise design team should review and confirm the validity of these recommendations before any action is taken.

Question #1, #2

**Who would notify the BC Provincial Emergency Program?
Who would contact the Energy Resources and Conservation Board?**

Recommendations:

- That the responsible party contacts the Oil and Gas Commission directly as a courtesy.
- That the responsible party checks with the PEP duty officer to find out who they will be notifying of the incident.
- That the responsible party contacts the Health Authorities immediately in the event of an incident that could impact or be perceived to impact public health in any way.
- That the responsible party contact the CIC as a courtesy in a cross jurisdictional event.

Question # 3

**Who has jurisdiction over this event?
What are the initial priorities of the agency with jurisdiction over this event?**

Recommendation:

- That it is important to involve the DFO in Planning Section from the beginning and those liaisons may be brought in at ICP to share resources.

Question #4

If requested how could BC Hydro potential modify operations to assist with mitigation?

Recommendation:

- That BC Hydro be notified immediately to determine if BC Hydro can adjust operations in order to assist with mitigating the effects. BC Hydro should be added to pipeline service providers' call out lists.

Question #5

What role will Indian and Northern Affairs Canada serve during this event?

Recommendation:

None

Question #6

What role will the National Energy Board serve during this event?

Recommendation:

None

Question #7

What role will Environment Canada serve during this event?

Recommendation:

None

Question #8

Are role and responsibilities entirely understood?

Recommendation:

- Northern Health noted that they should be part of the ICS to provide info related to health and should be consistent on both sides of the border possibly through a media or health liaison.

Question #9

Establishment of an Incident Command Post.

Recommendation:

- That research and planning be done on trying to establish a common ICS operating guide that would allow consistent communications, clarity and operational procedures.

Question #10

Concerning the establishment of an EOC

Recommendations:

- That a single EOC be established to coordinate cross border activities.
- That it may be prudent to co-locate EOC's of the various agencies for a bigger event, thereby establishing efficiencies in operations.

Question #11

Would this event precipitate a provincial state of emergency for BC or Alberta?

Recommendation:

None

Question #12

What types of sampling must be conducted at the site?

Recommendation:

- That sampling and testing be coordinated in all stages of the incident so as to not overwhelm the labs.

Question #14

What methods are considered acceptable for the disposal of cleanup materials?

Recommendation:

- Both provinces need to agree on standards to ensure consistency in the public's eye. Noted that the standards used will be the highest standards attainable across all jurisdictions depending on the circumstances at the time and that the response may vary depending on the time of year.

Question #15

What downstream users may be affected?

Recommendation:

- Publish incident reports so that the public can read and understand the information and to increase public trust.

Question #16

How will messages to the media be coordinated?

Recommendations:

- Messages to the media should be coordinated through media liaisons between agencies to provide a unified approach to media and news releases.
- Media liaisons should be involved in advance training sessions and discussions with emergency response personnel to increase their awareness of emergency management.

Question #17

Are all involved agencies using common terminology regarding the Incident Command Structure?

Noted that there are some discrepancies between terminologies.

Recommendation:

- ABENV noted that they need AEMA to determine a consistent system (ie, use ICS and teach it consistently to all agencies in Alberta.)

Question #18

Re the conceptual model of command structure to be used.

Recommendation:

- The OGC noted that they recognize that all agencies and companies need to use the same language across the board and that systems and terminology needs to be standardized.

Question #19

How will claims of compensation be handled?

Recommendation:

None

APPENDICES

Appendices

- A. Scenario
- B. Questions for Discussion
- B. Meeting Notes.
- C. Exercise Evaluation Comments from Participants

Peace River Oil Spill Panel Discussion

Scenario 1: Notification – Monday, May 11th 2009

Exercise, Exercise

It is 11:00 am on Monday, May 11th 2009. Temperatures in the Peace River Regional District have been approximately 10 Celsius during the day time, dropping to near freezing each night.

Outstanding Oil Corporation is a relatively new company to the Peace River Regional District. With its head office in Calgary, Outstanding Oil operates a large office in Fort St. John. Outstanding Oil maintains a series of pipelines which transport approximately 150,000 barrels per day of conventional crude oil. Much of the pipeline was built within the last 10 years and is well-maintained.

One of Outstanding Oil's key pipelines is a 6" line which crosses the Beaton River. This pipeline is used to transport sweet crude oil. Spring rains have increased the volume of water moving through the river. Many banks have been eroded, loosening the soil and rocks making up the nearby hillsides.

Suddenly, a catastrophic slope failure occurs, resulting in a large section of the river bank being washed away. The sliding soil has left a large section of the Outstanding Oil pipeline exposed. Within minutes, the resulting pressure on the line causes a single guillotine break to form, near the eastern shore of the Beaton River. A long section of pipe lies submerged in the Beaton River; a short section of pipe protrudes from the eastern bank, continuing to leak oil.

Emergency Shut Down sensors in the pipeline immediately detect the drop in pressure, instantly shutting off the pipeline either side of the Beaton River. However, there is approximately 45 cubic meters (45,000 litres) of sweet crude oil in the damaged section of pipeline. 25 cubic meters has spilled onto the eastern shore and into the Beaton River. The remaining 20 cubic meters of sweet crude oil remains in the submerged portion of pipe, held in place through vacuum force.

The drop in pressure is also recorded in the Outstanding Oil Corporations control centre through their Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Within minutes, Outstanding Oil staff have carried out the following actions:

- Activated their Incident Command Structure to respond to the spill; the Outstanding Oil Operations Foreman has taken on the role of Incident

Commander. Two logistics personnel have also been identified

- Alerted Western Canadian Spill Services (WCSS) about the alarm, and requested the dispatch of OSCARS (Oil Spill Containment and Recovery units) to the site. WCSS is mustering one OSCAR Trailer containing 300 meters of boom along with pumps, skimmers and hardware designed to contain and recover a hydrocarbon spill in surface water, and one workboat. (A barge is also available, if required)
- Dispatched the Outstanding Oil Corporation Cleanup and Containment Unit to the site. This unit maintains resources similar to those provided in the OSCAR trailer
- Dispatched a Outstanding Oil Pipeliner to provide reconnaissance of the spill by helicopter
- Instructed the logistics members to continue call out, as well as locate additional vacuum trucks for the storage of skimmed oil & water
- At this stage, no further notifications have been carried out.

The Pipeliner reports that the Beatton River is moving at approximately 7 km/hour. The Peace River is moving slightly fast at 9 km/h. At this rate of movement, the oil spill will likely cross into Alberta within the next 5-6 hours. The area around the pipeline appears to be unstable; response units may find it challenging to access the site.

It is now 11:30am.

Exercise, Exercise

Appendix B: Questions for Discussion

Questions:

Initial answer
to be
provided by:

Notification	Industry
1. Who would notify the British Columbia Provincial Emergency Program?	
2 Who would contact the Energy Resources and Conservation Board?	Industry
Response Structure	MOE & Pembina
3. Who has jurisdiction over this event?	
BC Hydro	BC Hydro
4. If requested, how could BC Hydro potentially modify operations to assist with mitigation?	
INAC	INAC
5. What role will INAC serve during this event?	
National Energy Board	NEB
6. What role will National Energy Board serve during this event?	
Environment Canada	Environment Canada
7. What role will Environment Canada serve during this event?	
8. Are roles and responsibilities entirely understood?	ALL
Response Structure	Pembina & WCSS
9. Will an Incident Command Post be activated?	
a. Where will the Incident Command Post be located?	
b. Will the Incident Command Post maintain single or unified command?	
c. Does your agency support unified command?	
10. Will an Emergency Operations Centre be activated?	MOE, OGC, ABENV, ERCB
a. Will this be the only one, or will other Emergency Operations Centers be activated?	
b. Where will the Emergency Operation Centre be located?	
c. Who will serve as the Director of the Emergency Operations Centre?	
d. Who will need to attend the Emergency Operations Centre?	
e. What resources will be available at this facility?	
11. Would this event precipitate a provincial state of emergency for British Columbia? For Alberta?	PEP, MOE, AEMA, Pembina
a. Who makes this determination?	
b. Based on what criteria?	
c. How does industry fit into this state of emergency? Can they exercise emergency powers?	

Cleanup		NH, MOE, PCH, & ABENV
12. What types of sampling must be conducted at the site?		
13. What standards must be achieved in order for the river cleanup to be considered successful?		NH, MOE, PCH, & ABENV
14. What methods are considered acceptable for the disposal of cleanup materials for British Columbia? For Alberta?		MOE & ABENV
a. Is incineration an option?		
Impact		ALL
15. What downstream users may be affected?		
Response Structure		ALL
16. How will messages to the media be coordinated?		
ICS Structure		ALL
17. Are all involved agencies using common terminology regarding the Incident Command Structure?		
Conceptual Model		WCSS, Pembina, MOE, ABENV
18. A conceptual model has been developed which details the structure that will be used to organize the work of the agencies responding to this type of event. What are exercise participant thoughts on this model?		
Compensation		MOE, PEP, ABENV & AEMA
19. How will claims of compensation be handled?		
a. To whom should claims be made?		
b. How are claims verified?		
c. Who ultimately decides what claims will be paid?		

Conceptual ICS Model:

**Multi-jurisdictional Meeting
August 26 - Suggested Conceptual Spill Layout
using the Incident Command System**

**Crisis Command
Corporate
Emergency
Operations
Centre (EOC)
Could be Calgary**



**Permanent EOC in Dawson Creek
or Onsite EOC possibly Blackfoot Park
May consist of
but not limited too:
Industry (generators)
NEB
BC MoE
Alta MoE
OGC
ERCB
WCSS
Health Authority
PEP
Local government**



**(Onsite Facility)
Incident Command
Post (ICP)
May be at Blackfoot
Park and Dunvegan
where staging will occur**

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Appendix C: Meeting Notes



PEACE RIVER REGIONAL DISTRICT

Peace River Oil Spill Panel Discussion

Meeting Notes & *Information Provided by Panel Members

DATE: Wednesday, January 14, 2009

TIME: 9:00 a.m.

PLACE: Best Western Inn, Dawson Creek, BC

PRESENT:

Panel

Terry Sawchuck, Ministry of Environment, Fort St. John
Bob Kelly, Provincial Emergency Program, Victoria
Dr. Charles Badenhorst, Northern Health Authority
Mike Burzek, Oil and Gas Commission
Glenn McTaggart, BC Hydro
Greg Carter, Alberta Emergency Response Team, Alberta Environment
Brad Andres, Alberta Emergency Management Agency
Terry Peck, Energy Resources Conservation Board
Jim Meagher, Alberta Health Services (Peace Country Health)
Robert Lemay, National Energy Board
Timothy Powers, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
Gerry Mitchell, Environment Canada
Michael Locke, Western Canadian Spill Services
Kim Reinbolt, Pembina

Facilitator

Scott Alpen, Justice Institute of BC

Participating Agencies

Ben Boetbher, MD of Fairview #136
Ray Skrepmer, MD of Fairview #136
Bernard Trevor, Alberta Environment
Garry Leather, Town of Fairview
Graham Knox, Ministry of Environment
Calvin Jarratt, Canadian Natural Resources
Heather McLoughla, Paramount Resources Ltd.
Phil Bell, Sabretooth Energy
Bob Carnell, Hi Country
Trisha Crawford, Pembina Pipelines
Laurent St. Louis, Sword Energy
Darryl Martin, Alberta Health Services
Ian Sharpe, Ministry of Environment
Greg Carter, Alberta Environment

Martin Bundril, Alberta Environment
Rhonda Brett, Alberta Environment
Kelly Jautz, EnCana

Participating Agencies (continued)

Greg Smith, Alberta Ministry of Environment
Duane Jaschke, Pembina Pipelines
Jimmy Yee, Northern Health, Dawson Creek
Nolan Steinwand, Pengrowth Corp.
Dean Wilfur, Suncor Energy
Dean Wilfur, Iteration Energy
Brice Daly, AEMA
Tammy Loiselle, ERCB
Reg Marquardt, Ministry of Environment
Dave Baker, Devon
Heidi Elias-Bertram, Oil and Gas Commission
Dallas Bartsch, Oil and Gas Commission
Keith Moore, Enerplus Energy
Rob Crawford, Enerplus Energy
Darryl Thomas, Harvest Energy Trust
Brian Lamond, Spectra Energy
Brian Ballard, Saddle Hills County

Regional District

Fred Banham, Chief Administrative Officer
Trish Morgan, Community Services Coordinator
Suzanne Garrett, Corporate Services Coordinator

- 1) Call to Order Mr. Alpen called the proceedings to order at 9:00 a.m. and introduced Panel Members to the participating agencies.

- 2) Background A multi jurisdictional meeting was held in August 2008. As a result of that meeting it was suggested that a panel discussion be held in the 2009 involving as many stakeholders.

- 3) Purpose The purpose of this panel discussion is to explore the structure and coordination of oil spill response and recovery operations by examining a hypothetical oil spill into the Peace River which crosses the BC / Alberta border.

- 4) Objectives
 1. Validate the activities related to notification of key agencies.
 2. Clarify the response structure that will be used by participating agencies.
 3. Determine the potential impact of this event on downstream users.
 4. Summarize the activities and standards to be followed in a successful cleanup.
 5. Clarify the process used for the provision of compensation.
 6. Evaluate the conceptual model used to structure responding agencies.

5) Scenario Those in attendance reviewed the Peace River Oil Spill exercise Scenario.

6)

**Question # 1 & #2 Who would notify the BC Provincial Emergency Program?
Who would contact the Energy Resources and
Conservation Board?**

The responsible party would contact the Provincial Emergency Program's (PEP) 24 hour Emergency Coordination Centre at 1-800-663-3456. The information from that call is then immediately relayed to the appropriate Provincial and Federal Agencies (OGC, MOE and Environment Canada).

All supporting agencies upon notification will also have their own call out list which may change depending on the type of incident and the level. OGC has a contract with PEP for reporting Level 1, 2, and 3 incidents (see below). However, within specific industry Emergency Response Plans there is a list of who needs to be contacted. PEP may not call these agencies as they are the responsibility of the responsible party to do so.

The OGC standby duty officer will assess the event and give it and Oil and Gas Emergency level 1, 2 or 3:

- Level 1 Emergency—there is no immediate danger to the public or environment as no H₂S has been released; the emergency is confined to the lease or company property.
- Level 2 Emergency—there is potential for risk to the public or environment, as the emergency could extend beyond company property. However, control is still possible.
- Level 3 Emergency - An immediate danger to the public or environment exists; control of the situation has been lost.

The Incident is also ranked by the MOE EERO receiving the call as either Code 1 (minor event) or Code 2 (major event) based on the nature of the incident. The rank (Code 1 or 2) that is given to the incident by the MOE EERO determines the PEP notification fan out procedure. Code 1 notifies only the essential agencies while Code 2 requires far more agencies and people to be notified.

To notify Alberta, PEP has contacts for cross jurisdictional events in which they can contact the Coordination and Information Center (CIC) who will in turn contact Alberta

Support and Emergency Response Team (ASERT) and other agencies as needed (i.e., ERCB, etc.).

MOE may also contact ASERT directly who will notify required provincial and municipal agencies that are affected in Alberta.

Ministry of Environment is responsible to call Northern Health if there are public health issues by calling the emergency number in Prince George. MOE may also contact the Medical Health Officer directly depending on the incident.

Noted that Health Authorities should be involved immediately to make a health hazard and risk assessment possibly in collaboration with MOE.

On a provincially regulated pipeline, MOE with OGC would have shared jurisdiction, although initially it is an OGC incident. MOU states OGC is main lead, until all safety issues have been addressed. Once product leaves the pipeline then MOE becomes lead. Unified command structure, Environment Canada, DFO, MoH, lots of players support jurisdiction.

Department of Fisheries & Oceans

DFO usually has an investigative role out of the Command Centre and provide resource people in command centre to advise on cleanup, remediation and enforcement. Responsible party would work collaboratively with DFO.

Recommendations:

- 1) That the responsible party contact the Oil and Gas Commission directly as a courtesy.
- 2) That the responsible party check with the PEP duty officer to find out whom they will be notifying of the incident.
- 3) Ensure that Health Authorities are contacted immediately in the event of an incident that could impact or be perceived to impact public health in any way.
- 4) That the responsible party contact the CIC as a courtesy in a cross jurisdictional event.

Question #3

**Who has jurisdiction over this event?
What are the initial priorities of the agency with jurisdiction over this event?**

For this event the OGC would initially be the lead agency, while still respecting unified command. Then as the incident has gone past the pipeline right of way, MOE would become

the lead agency with OGC in support, until the event is complete.

Industry is concerned that it will answer to DFO. Noted that it is important to involve DFO in Planning Section from the beginning and that liaisons may be brought in at ICP to share resources

Northern Health noted that hazard and risk assessments are different and that the media will drive the reporting of the event in the beginning.

Initial priorities of the agency with lead jurisdiction would follow BCERMS objectives including pipeline specific objectives of securing the areas affected to protect people, shut off spill at source, contain spilled material, protect drinking sources, clean up spill.

Question #4

If requested, how could BC Hydro potentially modify operations to assist with mitigation?

BC Hydro would be contacted by MOE or responsible party.

BC Hydro would do whatever was possible at the time to mitigate the spill within operating constraints; if we are made aware of a spill BC Hydro can do things to mitigate.

Each day BC Hydro adjusts operations to meet a multitude of environmental considerations at one plant or another. However, what could be done would depend on many factors at the time of the incident.

BC Hydro's response would depend on power demands (market) and restrictions on the power system; consider natural gas availability for Burrard Generating Station, availability of units around the system, fisheries constraints (e.g., sturgeon on the Columbia), the demand for power in the province, etc. Earlier BC Hydro is advised the better and can then prepare to replace energy.

The response would likely look quite different in May (low demand) than January (high demand); in May we would certainly have more flexibility as the demand is significantly lower. Restrictions could occur at any time of the year depending on a multitude of circumstances. For instance, winter may be difficult to mitigate because of potential ice dams or ice shelves at Peace River, AB or if a dam needs to be spilled. BC Hydro has been advised that they should never lower the level of the river during an oil spill event as it may

create more pollution and that keeping it at a constant level or raising the level may assist in mitigating the effects of the spill.

The Peace is one of BC Hydro's only flexible systems in terms of flow left in the province and the flexibility allows them to meet fluctuating demand quite quickly; they may quickly increase or decrease flows to meet demand at certain times. Their priority is to keep the lights on, while mitigating environmental impact to the best of our ability. We would have to consider the larger benefit to society – e.g., oil spill impacts vs. blackout to Lower Mainland

Whether BC Hydro can accommodate a certain flow regime on the Peace depends on many factors such as:

- Can they buy energy to replace it?
- Are the tie lines from the US and Alberta full? (This would prevent us from importing energy to replace it).
- Do they have natural gas available to run Burrard?
- Are there restrictions on the Columbia system that would prevent us from being able to transfer the generation to/from that system?
- Are they under flow control to mitigate against ice jam flooding in the Town of Peace River?
- Is the probability of the spill for Williston high or is spill immanent?

Ministry of Environment noted that when planning control points for booms that raising or dropping water might change the position of booms. In this scenario it would take 12 to 14 hours before a raise in water level is seen in the river.

Question asked if BC Hydro should be required to alter generation to mitigate an oil spill situation on the Peace River and that change in generation should come at a cost to the corporation, will BC Hydro be looking for compensation, or will BC Hydro cover the cost?

BC Hydro in consultation with the government agencies involved with the oil spill would consider what was in the best overall interest of society (including BC, Alberta and others affected). If the costs were minimal (e.g., minor flow augmentations for a day or two) then BC Hydro would likely absorb costs. If mitigation required major and/or longer changes in flow or significantly affected the ability to meet power demands in the province then the cost could be significant and BC Hydro would seek decision for compensation at higher levels within the corporation and the provincial government if necessary. *(Please note answer was provided by BC Hydro after the January 14, 2009 discussion)*

MD of Fairview concerned about who would notify them about raises or drops in water level due to such an event. Alberta Environment would notify all water users and those affected in Alberta.

To contact BC Hydro call:
PSOSE (Planning, Scheduling, Operations and Shift Engineers) at 604-891-5098 and the local G. M. Shrum Generation Operators at 250-783-5021 are good first contacts and the call out would fan out to whatever level in the organization was required to make the decision; larger consequences would require higher levels of approval.

Recommendation:

5) Contact BC Hydro immediately to determine if BC Hydro can adjust operations in order to assist with mitigating the effects.

Question #5

What role will Indian and Northern Affairs Canada serve during this event?

INAC provides information to First Nations on reserve lands throughout Canada. In the event of an incident that may impact First Nations, information would be passed onto Health Canada and/or Environment Canada. These agencies would advise INAC of the hazard and risk, who would liaise with First Nations. INAC may request bands conduct sampling and have Health Canada review and provide determination of findings.

INAC noted that Treaty 8 Tribal Association should have been invited they speak for themselves and possibly some individual local First Nations.

In the EOC, INAC would sit as stakeholder under Planning Section to ensure First Nations interests are considered.

In BC, First Nations are on the MOE fan out list. It was suggested that First Nations be asked how they would like to be involved in the command structure. Usually they choose different levels depending on their band and the particular incident.

First Nations Emergency Services Society (FNESS) will assist bands affected at the request of INAC and depending on the hazard. FNESS is funded agency under INAC, which assists displaced people, provides social services support and can be deployed as needed.

In Alberta, ERCB has Aboriginal liaisons that would make contact with Alberta First Nations.

Question #6

What role will the National Energy Board serve during this event?

If the pipeline in question is a NEB, federally regulated, pipeline NEB is the lead and would coordinate a multiagency response. The federal family of agencies would take a one window approach and speak as one voice while using ICS. Federal agencies will form a committee and will make decisions as a committee (management by objectives). NEB would work with other agencies so they can access the site to verify compliance and enforcement.

Jurisdiction will be as big as the scene and NEB will continue to follow-up with remediation for years to come to ensure that proper cleanup has taken place. However, once the product leaves the lease MOE becomes lead and NEB works within their jurisdiction.

Since NEB is geographically spread out across the country there would be a delay in response, as such NEB has MOU's with the OGC and ERCB to take the lead until NEB is on site. Company would still call PEP or the CIC to start their notification process.

Transportation Safety Board may be involved depending on the incident and will investigate.

Question #7

What role will Environment Canada serve during this event?

Environment Canada (EC) has 2 roles being enforcement and investigation. EC would be notified by PEP and would establish the Regional Environmental Emergencies Team (REET) and would make REET available as a source of expertise and control to the responsible party and the lead agency. If BC MOE chose to chair REET, EC would provide support to MOE. If MOE was too busy, or declined, EC would chair it on behalf of all affected parties. In either event, EC would integrate the process into the preferred Unified Command or ICS structure employed to respond possibly in the Planning Section.

As an advisor, EC would expect to be informed and consulted by Unified Command on matters related to certain Federal responsibilities including fisheries and migratory birds, First

Nations issues, provision of scientific expertise, and on matters that might involve downstream impacts across the provincial border. EC would present consensus REET decisions to UC for action and/or consideration.

On a daily basis, EC and REET expertise would generally be provided through the Planning Section, once that was well-established and expert fisheries, wildlife, weather, hydrology, etc. participants were in place. Access and interaction with Command is needed at a high level to ensure that decisions made there are compliant with good environmental practices and regulations.

EC Pacific Yukon Region and Prairie Northern Region initiated the Wabamum REET due to the serious, long-term nature of that response. Additional EC staff from other Regions were rotated through the Command Centre. If the spill originates in BC, an EC office will organize and chair that coordinated response, and provide it to the lead agency. In planning for a possibly long-term event, this is an important service that should be accessed early by the lead agency. EC Regions have considerable expertise internally plus they can access Canada-wide support from other sources.

Northern Health inquired as to the approach agencies would take to sample biomass as a result of a “slow leak” scenario.

Once EC has been called out, staff would determine impacts, mitigation, risks, hazards, etc. all which are an integral part of EC. EC would mobilize sample crews ASAP in coordination with Health Canada and MOE.

Question #8

Are role and responsibilities entirely understood?

Northern Health noted that health risk due to contamination with private, public water, fish, wildlife and waterfowl is a concern. Recreational users, swimmers, and crops may also face potential health risks.

Health authorities need to be able to respond to public concerns and health facilities to be able to deal with people who are affected therefore, health authorities need to be advised immediately in order to act and prepare. Important to note that some chemicals need long term exposure to cause minor harm while other chemicals require only short term exposure to cause great harm.

Northern Health has a 24 hr emergency number (250 565-2000) at the Prince George Hospital to report emergencies.

Northern health noted that they should be part of the ICS to provide info related to health and should be consistent on both sides of the border possibly through a media or health liaison.

Question #9

**Will an Incident Command Post be activated?
Where will the Incident Command Post be located?
Will the Incident Command Post maintain single or unified command?
Does your agency support unified command?
Who will serve as the Incident Commander(s)?
What resources will they have with them?**

Every company is different, however Pembina would be on scene and at the site. Pembina would invite other agencies to participate. The Area Supervisor would be the Incident Commander until relieved. Unified command would recommend a liaison officer to act as their representative.

WCSS role is to provide equipment and boats and possibly advise as to control points, etc.

The OGC would not be in unified command, but would oversee the company to ensure response to incident is appropriate. MOE and OGC would work together to monitor responsible party

ERCB may take command before the NEB is on-site at the ICP.

Area office would normally act as ICP and would add more people if needed (i.e., if roadblocks were needed would hire contractors or ask RCMP in interim).

Sword Energy noted that Calgary they are regulated heavily under Directive 71 as to how they respond. ERP's are very detailed for residents and crossings. There are 3 levels of alert, with Level 3 being the most critical and if the site cannot be contained it says what must be done.

INAC noted that if break on reserves it would be different scenario. EC may have to take IC role on reserve lands. Queried if industry has a plan for going on reserve lands?

Pembina noted that they have a right of way during an emergency and that they are still the responsible party. Under the ERP and their tenure they are authorized to access the land but recognize there may be some issues. ICP would be located as close as possible to the incident.

Noted: some terms are still being used differently. Noted that traditionally the Incident Commander is the on-site person. The Incident Command Post can be anywhere people/agencies meet and make tactical decisions.

BC uses BCERMS, ICP close to incident as possible with appropriate resources. ICP may need to be moved once other agencies all come online to provide food, housing, computers, etc. The EOC provides support and resources. The ICP is where tactical decisions are made.

Northern Health questioned how would the EOC or ICS structure during a pandemic be used?

Noted that the Incident Command System works for most events and that the health profession generally does not use this system. Northern Health noted that they are pushing to put this system in place.

Question #10

Will this be the only one, or will other Emergency Operations Centers be activated?

Will an Emergency Operations Centre be activated?

Where will the Emergency Operation Centre be located?

Who will serve as the Director of the Emergency Operations Centre?

Who will need to attend the Emergency Operations Centre?

What resources will be available at this facility?

An EOC should be activated in the event that a respective agency or stakeholder feels it is necessary to support the ICP (site level response). EOC activation will be the decision of each agency or stakeholder and there may be more than one EOC. The critical point is that the ICP runs the response and makes all tactical decisions. The ICP may request support in terms of equipment, personnel, etc. from the various EOCs. Incident Commanders may contact their respective EOC or executive for policy decisions requiring clarification.

Local government / regional district – will typically activate their EOC if there are significant impacts to their constituents (example: evacuation or notifications are required, services will be interrupted, etc), or if they will be required to provide support to the ICP. Local governments utilize their EOC to manage the impacts and needs of their community.

When larger group is implemented unified command center then you have an ICP, need room for 50 computers, separate rooms for public liaison officers

ABENV will open their EOC and/or place someone in the Planning Section at the industry ICP. AEMA noted that a provincial EOC would be opened to support other provincial agencies' EOC's. ERCB would act as a support agency to the ABENV Grande Prairie field center. They would support, liaise with company.

The OGC oversee company and responsible party and would activate their EOC to support the responsible party. Noted that 90% of industry's staff are located in Calgary where they make tactical decisions or provide support through their EOC.

ABENV would activate EOC to support efforts for containment, recovery, media, wildlife, downstream users, and water testing.

Peace Country Health noted that they are trained up in ICS but are still struggling to adopt it throughout.

MOE noted that there could be a multitude of EOC's set-up from municipal to provincial ministries depending on how big the event. MOE would try to co-locate with the responsible party if possible.

MOE and Alberta Environment noted that logistically a small oil company shouldn't run an ICP from Calgary and that they need to be as close to scene as possible to make tactical decisions. For instance, the incident in Johnstone Strait the ICP was 300 km away in Duncan which was too far away. When there are multiple agencies they may have to move because need infrastructure for communications, etc. Changes to ICS have evolved because of logistics for small companies. Larger companies utilize ICS more easily.

Recommendation

6) To have one ICP versus one ICP on each side of the border as it may deplete resources.

Question #11

**Would this event precipitate a provincial state of emergency for BC or Alberta?
Who makes this determination?
Based on what criteria?
How does industry fit into this state of emergency? Can they exercise emergency powers?**

For BC it would not be likely that a provincial state of emergency would be declared. In BC there are three different states of emergency being environmental, local and provincial states of emergency. In this case it may be environmental versus provincial, which would be declared by the Minister of Environment as it relates to spills, hazardous materials and access to provincial coffers.

Alberta does not have an Environmental State of Emergency. For Alberta local governments may declare local state(s) of emergency in order to shut off water and to advise residents. A provincial state of emergency would not likely be declared in this case.

Noted that Health in BC and Alberta have powers that can be exercised to shut off water, order evacuations, etc.

Noted that no one regulatory power is suppressed in an emergency and that all levels of government have the right to exercise their legislated power taking a collaborative approach.

Industry cannot declare state of emergency. Must call PEP in BC and every agency listed in the ERP. If it is a NEB pipeline, the responsible party company has to advise NEB of who has been contacted.

PEP noted that there are 57 hazards in BC and the ECC in Victoria may be dealing with a number of incidents at one time. ECC not set up to deal with all specifics but rather to kick start other agencies to get the ball rolling. PEP advised that the responsible party ask the ECC who they will be notifying and that they still contact all agencies listed in their ERP as it would be better for an agency to get two calls rather than none at all.

Question #12 & 13

**What types of sampling must be conducted at the site?
What standards must be achieved in order for the river cleanup to be considered successful?**

Sampling at the site is the responsibility of the responsible party. Parameters for sampling, testing and monitoring should be determined in a sampling plan developed in the Planning Section with sign off by the IC.

ABENV noted that after the Wabamun incident the public wanted to see government taking samples and testing as they did not trust the responsible party.

Northern Health noted that a sampling plan should be developed first detailing where, when, how often, how to interpret information, how to inform the public, results, and activities (make part of process). Suggested that taking 15 samples are more effective than 1000 and that if possible to use two labs - one for second set of tests to check for accuracy and interpretation.

ABENV noted that sampling and testing can overwhelm labs when all agencies start taking their own samples. Recommended that sampling and testing be coordinated in all stages of the incident.

Northern Health queried if there are any benefits to sampling before the spill?

MOE noted that a Sampling Plan determines background level (pre-conditions) ensures that it is achievable for end points. Noted that usually upstream tests may change seasonally, that why all players need to be at the table to decide and verify a plan. Noted

MOE noted that it's important to know what you are asking for and what it will be used for in your testing. Also important to establish end points to determine what is clean in advance.

Noted that public health has specific tests for water treatment. In the event of an incident, health staff or municipal staff would be sampling water to determine if water users need to be notified or if limitations on water usage needs to be provided.

ABENV noted that due to the potential impacts to wildlife, birds and ungulates that a Wildlife Management Plan should be developed through the Planning Section.

Recommendation

7) That sampling and testing be coordinated in all stages of the incident so as to not overwhelm labs.

Question #14

What methods are considered acceptable for the disposal of cleanup materials for British Columbia? For Alberta?

All methods and options are considered in cleanup. MOE will negotiate with the responsible party to obtain the best end result whether it be burning, land fill, etc. The Waste Management Unit of the Planning Section develops an incident specific waste management plan consistent with the Environmental Management Act. This will get signed off by Incident Commanders and be implemented by the responsible party.

Standards such as the Canadian Drinking Water Standards and fresh water aquatic life regulations will be taken into account. The end result will depend on circumstances in which sometimes the fix can be worse than problem itself.

Devon Canada noted that they are concerned with working with different standards between BC and Alberta. Noted, that both provinces need to agree on standards to ensure consistency in public's eye. Noted that the standards used will be the highest standards attainable across all jurisdictions depending on the circumstances at the time and that the response may vary depending on the time of year.

Question #15**What downstream users may be affected?**

Recreational users, industry, pulp & paper, golf courses, irrigation, agriculture intakes, raw water use and municipal water systems could all be affected.

ABENV has a list of all water user and licensed water users. A database of licensed water users also exists in BC.

Noted, that for Level 2 and Level 3 incidents the responsible party must provide a post incident summary report within 30 days of the incident. Northern Health noted that information should be published in a way that the public to can read and understand the information. This will increase public trust.

Recommendation

8) Publish incident reports so that the public to can read and understand the information to increase public trust.

Question 16**How will messages to the media be coordinated?**

PEP noted that emergency management only works well when there are good working relationships throughout. All agencies should vet their information through a combined media news release ahead of time. Also important to establish media contacts in advance, pool resources and work off same page. It doesn't matter who provides the information to the media as long as it is a coordinated effort and not delayed. The BC PREOC can coordinate media releases but if the incident has no effect on local government then they possibly wouldn't. Otherwise it is important for staff to have after hour's numbers and coordinate media on their own.

Noted that onsite staff must be kept "safe" from media, as the media will try to get information from the site as well.

Northern Health noted that Health Authorities must be advise of the incident before the media as the media will in most instances contact the Health Authorities for information.

ABENV noted that no media representatives were present today however, should be in future as they will be involved in crafting technical messages to the media and public.

WCSS suggested that media control points be established at the site to deter information leaking to the media from the field.

Recommendation

9) Messages to the media should be coordinated through media liaisons between agencies to provide a unified approach to media and news releases.

10) Media liaisons should be involved in advance training sessions and discussions with emergency response personnel to increase their awareness of emergency management.

Question #17

Are all involved agencies using common terminology regarding the Incident Command Structure?

Noted that there are some discrepancies between terminologies.

Some agencies are looking at firming up requirements to use same terminology and structure (e.g., OGC is examining).

Noted that if agencies and industry are not mandated to use the same system (i.e., ICS) then discrepancies may continue to occur.

In BC the BCERMS Committee is looking to update and clarify some terms.

ABENV noted that they need AEMA to determine consistent system (i.e., use ICS and teach it consistently to everyone).

Question #18

A conceptual model has been developed which details the structure that will be used to organize the work of the agencies responding to this type of event. What are exercise participant thoughts on this model?

MOE noted that they would prefer to see a conceptual model similar to that noted on the flipchart (see below after question 19).

Industry noted that the OGC, ERCB and NEB dictate what they do and that they have few options on their part.

The OGC noted that they recognize that they all agencies and companies need to use the same language across the board and that things need to be standardized.

Question 19

How will claims of compensation be handled?

Polluters have the responsibility to pay for everything. NEB and MOE have cost recovery systems in place to bill out expenses to responsible party.

ABENV only bills out costs to responsible party if there are secondary impacts (i.e., changes way deliver health care then we bill out).


A benefit of using ICS is that the Documentation Unit and Finance and Admin can assist in processing documents for payment.

Finished 2:55 pm

Mr. Banham thanked everyone for attending.

The discussion adjourned at 3:00 p.m.

Proposed Incident Command Structure



Appendix D: Exercise Evaluation Comments from Participants

Comments: (General)

- A lot of time spent on terminology re: ICS etc. No definitive answers to specific questions IE: time for spill to reach Dunvegan (town of Fairview water intake) in example given.
- A very good discussion topic. I think that this would be easily expanded to a number of separate discussions.
- An inter-provincial working group should be formed to address operating guidelines on cross-boundary deployment, focusing on notification, operations (in an ICP) and media communications.
- The exercise provided an excellent agency, industry networking opportunity.
- Very good flow of discussion and well moderated by Scott. Great job.
- It is really good to see these discussions occurring.
- Very informative.
- Over all the interaction between the board members and attendees was excellent. Great mixtures of ideas.

Comments:

Suggestions for next exercise:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ RE: Peace River changes – the list of contacts will need upgrading when Glacier Power starts construction of their power Weir west of Dunvegan. ▪ Identify who will be the lead agency ▪ Develop an organizational chart using pure ICS terminology to describe positions. ▪ Distribute to all agencies. ▪ Hands on exercise with role playing ▪ Plan to better delineate misunderstandings of ICS terminology at the various agency levels and systems ▪ More discussion warranted at the provincial level regarding the boundary issues ▪ Further discussions on terminology and structure ▪ Need an understanding what agencies are pursuing to address this (new directives?) ▪ More clarification on ICS terminology to try to become more consistent ▪ It would be good to host another exercise involving the same stakeholders in 2 years ▪ We could look at a Field exercise
Suggestions for future training:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Have media folks attend from the different companies as well.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy Response plan – consolidate / integrate a generic plan ▪ Have visual aids such as PowerPoint wall charts showing communication flow, command structures, unified command models etc. Much work is yet to be done with incident command system. ▪ Media management and messaging coordination ▪ Need further discussions within a smaller group to discuss larger issues around terminology and structure and better understanding of a large event. ▪ After SOG's done (in draft), day long TTX ▪ More panel discussions ▪ Possible sour well blowout with evacuations in both Alberta and BC as scenario ▪ Involve media relations personnel, NGO's and First Nations. ▪ Get "boots on the ground"
<p>Comments on the physical venue:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ok ▪ Venue was fine ▪ Good ▪ Venue was dine ▪ worked well ▪ Good facility, everyone had good access to the panel and was workable. ▪ Very good ▪ Great Venue – Dawson Creek is great central location for the Peace. ▪ The venue was very good, sound system could have been better, Food services were excellent.
<p>Other Comments:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ I was expecting a more specific exercise following the lead of scenario 1 ie: time lines and who does what at what stage and what is the follow up during the incident. ▪ Thanks – great help. ▪ An additional "break" or two would allow more time for networking. ▪ Conduct a tabletop to cover the event. ▪ A lot of very valuable discussion and hopefully a better understanding of what will be required by an RP in a "large" event. ▪ Compliments and thanks to PRRD. Well done! ▪ Great session, great initiative, very valuable ▪ Really great discussion and well attended by cross-section of industry and Gov't. ▪

